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Review Article 
"STEEL PRODUCTION IN SCOTLAND: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 1990s" 
A REVIEW 
James Love, Department of Economics, 
and 
James Stevens, Fraser of Allander Institute, 
University of Strathclyde 
(i) Introduction 
This paper serves to review a recent report 
prepared for Strathclyde Regional Council by 
Glasgow University on the subject of the future of 
plate production in Scotland. A general theme 
which the Glasgow Study seeks to develop is that 
Scotland is by no means a poor location from which 
to produce and market steel products. This is a 
point which we accept unreservedly. Thus arguments 
set out concerning the cost advantages afforded 
through access to the deepwater docking facilities 
at Hunterston and the existence of a skilled, 
flexible and motivated workforce are given correct 
and proper emphasis. With respect to bulk handling 
of iron ore, coking coal and other materials, the 
Study points out that, on the basis of present 
throughput, savings of at least £5.5m potentially 
accrue from an ability to utilise larger vessels 
than at any of BS's other facilities. In addition, 
the study convincingly argues that freight charges 
are set to double over the coming decade and that 
this would increase the attractions to BS of using 
Hunterston where, as the report points out "there 
is plenty of scope to reap the benefits from 
economies of scale in shipping." (p:28) 
The existence and potential of Hunterston 
underpins the view, set out succinctly in an 
unpublished paper by Mr. Ted Ramsay, that it is 
more economically and environmentally efficient to 
transport semi finished or finished steel products 
into the congested Euro centre than bulk 
quantities of raw materials. In this context, the 
penalties of transporting steel from a peripheral 
location are offset by both the aforementioned 
transport savings and demonstrably lower operating 
costs. At a time when the EC is framing the 1995 
General Objectives for Steel a coherent argument 
both could and should be made that the periphery 
is an optimal location to base steelmaking and 
certain steel using industries and that a spatial 
policy rather than a free market approach towards 
the location of such activity is warranted. The 
Glasgow Study provides limited but valuable 
evidence on this issue. We will return to tMs 
question in our concluding remarks in the context 
of the locational upheavals which will arise f>-om 
the progressive adoption of new steelmaking 
processes from the middle of the 1990s. 
In our view, the problems and traumas experienced 
by the Scottish steel industry in the 1980s did 
not result from Scotland being an inherently poor 
place to base steelmaking operations. The basic 
difficulty emanated from the fact that steel 
production in Scotland is controlled externally 
and that the Scottish plants came to be regarded 
as marginal to BS's likely requirements. Although 
the terms of privatisation would compel BS to sell 
the Ravenscraig operation should it be genuinely 
surplus to requirements, the obstacles to securing 
some sort of spin-off are formidable. Thus, it is 
our intention to clarify the strongest case for 
continued Scottish steel production within a 
British Steel framework. This necessitates 
consideration of both the technological and market 
trends which will shape the evolution of the 
industry in the coming decade. I" addition, to 
understand the issues facing the industry, we 
review the investment decisions taken in tne 
1980 and where they leave Scotland in ^995. We 
do not accept that the Glasgow study has been 
successful in demonstrating that BS shareholders 
are best served by siting the platemill in 
Scotland. It is our view that the plate mill 
decision cannot be isolated from the trends and 
pressures influencing the wider Scottish sector 
and that unless a case for steelmaking can be 
made, a Scottish platemill is best sited elsewhere 
within the corporation. We conclude that the best 
possible case reflects new technology which 
favours the development of facilities at 
Hunterston. 
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(ii) Demand, Technology and Steel Strategy. 
The Glasgow Study outlines the ongoing trend in 
the market for steel products. The Report sets out 
that "throughout the 1970s and 1980s the market 
for steel has been characterised by increasing 
product differentiation and market segmentation" 
and that "there is every reason to believe that 
this trend towards increased product 
differentiation will continue and that for the 
most part it will be demand led."(p:5) Thus, steel 
users are becoming more specific in their 
requirements and, as the market for most classes 
of steel product fragments, it will be difficult 
for steelmakers to structure throughput in order 
to generate long production runs. 
This view of the evolving nature of steel demand 
commands widespread support amongst steel 
strategists and analysts. However, few would 
accept the limited supply side argument which the 
Glasgow Study chooses to derive from this trend. 
This is because the Report totally and explicitly 
ignores technological trends and how they will 
influence steel supply and the Scottish situation. 
Although advanced computer control and automation 
of processes are also of considerable importance, 
Love and Stevens(1989) argue that there are 2 
imminent process innovations which will have a 
major bearing on future world steel production. 
(a) Thin Slab Casting: This process dispenses 
with the need to invest in Hot Strip Mills of the 
type located at Motherwell. A thin slab caster 
inputs liquid steel and outputs a thin strip of 
hot material which can be transformed into a 
saleable product with minimal further preparation. 
In short, it is a continuous caster which produces 
strip products with minimal further processing and 
lower capital and operating costs. At present, 
variants of this technology are being adopted in 
US, German and Italian plants. In the USA, the 
Nucor Corporation has installed the German SMS 
thin slab casting system at the Crawfordsville 
mini-mill in Indiana. The caster has experienced 
well-publicised difficulties which have resulted 
in Nucor posting losses. In addition, there is 
controversy over the quality of the final product. 
However, the technical problems are being 
addressed and eliminated. In Germany, Thyssen are 
testing a rival German system at the Ruhort Works. 
This is a joint venture with the French state 
steelmaker Usinor-Sacilor and reports indicate 
satisfactory progress with commercial production 
at Ruhort of 5-600000 tonnes p.a. expected within 
1 to 2 years. In Italy, a third, recently patented 
German technology is being installed at 
Finaverdi's strip plant in Cremona. The caster is 
to be commissioned in 1991 and will have an annual 
throughput of 500,000 tonnes p.a. These and other 
similar technologies promise to substantially 
lower the minimum efficient scale of integrated 
stripmills. This will result in cost effective 
small scale production of most ranges of hot strip 
and could signal the way for steel users to 
manufacture all or part of their own requirements. 
Ex-post, this technology could call into question 
the wisdom of the current wave of modernisations 
of traditional stripmills. 
(b) Direct Smelting: The dominant steelmaking 
process involves the production in a blast 
furnace of molten iron from iron ore and coke. The 
molten iron is fed into a basic oxygen converter 
for the final preparation of liquid steel. This 
process, referred to as the BF-B0S route, involves 
the use of at least 4 steps. All ore must be 
graded and prepared for the BF and low grades and 
finer grades can only be used after an 
agglomeration process known as sintering. The coal 
requires to be baked in coke ovens to produce coke 
for the smelting operation. The BF and the steel 
converter complete the sequence. This collection 
of operations is both capital and energy intensive 
and subject to economies of scale. Thus as plant 
size increases, the average cost of a tonne of 
steel falls. Direct smelting promises to eliminate 
the need for coke ovens, blast furnaces and oxygen 
converters by preparing steel from ore and coal in 
a single furnace. Several major steelmakers are 
attempting to perfect this technology. The 
expectation within the industry is that direct 
smelters will go into operation within 5 to 10 
years. BS are involved in a joint venture with the 
Dutch steelmaker Hoogovens on a variation of this 
technology. BS Technical Director, Dr. Frank 
Fitzgerald, has given industry specialists 
periodic progress reports which indicate that BS 
appear likely to have a commercial system within 
this time horizon. The Direct Smelting process 
would provide steel from low capacity furnaces at 
prices competitive with the large BF-B0S 
operations. This offers a low- cost entry into a 
capital intensive industry and has major 
implications for the structure of the sector. 
Against such a background, steelmakers will 
approach the construction of new coke ovens, blast 
furnaces and oxygen converters with some caution. 
A recent IISI survey of Western World cokemaking 
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capacity indicates that plant producing 46.6mt 
p.a. has been decommissioned between 1982 and 
1988. West Germany is the only industrialised 
country which has embarked upon a major 
modernisation programme and growth in capacity is 
otherwise located in LDCs such as Brazil, India 
and Korea. Because the commercial availability and 
timing of Direct Smelters is uncertain, all 
Western World steelmakers face a strategic 
dilemma. Although the coal injection process which 
reduces the need for coke in Blast Furnaces has 
offset some of the pressure, coke is set to become 
in short supply and may force certain steelmakers 
to modernise capacity over the coming period. As 
indicated above, West Germany is modernising its 
cokemaking facilities as part of a wider upgrading 
of existing BF-BOS systems. Other steelmakers will 
avoid such commitments unless absolutely 
necessary. 
The implications of such impending technological 
developments were set out in a paper presented at 
Metal Bulletin's Third European Steel Conference 
by Marcel Genet of McKinsey & Co. Genet's theme of 
quality restructuring is set against a background 
in which new steel products are increasingly 
customised to specific user applications. His main 
argument is that steelmakers will require to adopt 
"small scale, capital saving technologies" and 
that this would prompt the industry to "dis-
integrate" into a number of highly specialised 
sectors. He endorses the view that technologically 
advanced minimills will progressively encroach 
upon the traditional product range preserves of 
the large scale integrated operators. In this 
view, 5 discernible types of steel producer will 
emerge in the early part of the next century. 
First, a group of global, technology intensive 
companies providing advanced and differentiated 
products to large quality-conscious customers such 
as car makers. Second, a "potentially global group 
of entrepreneurial companies which have built 
their strategies around applying new process 
technologies." Third, a set of producers applying 
"hybrid technologies" to supply either regional or 
client-based niche markets. Four, traditional 
mini-mills. Five, "a gradually shrinking group of 
traditional companies that have failed to make the 
transition to one of the preceding four groups." 
Genet concludes by stressing that decisions made 
over the next few years will determine which of 
these routes specific companies take. 
Thus, there is every reason to expect any 
assessment of BS's strategic options to have 
technology as a central consideration. However the 
Glasgow Study seeks to isolate the platemill 
decision from wider technological trends in a 
wholly invalid way. The Report sets out its 
technological assumptions thus, "according to 
ECSC, the kind of technical change likely to 
emerge in the 1991-1995 period will concentrate 
'on optimising existing processes with a view to 
producing faster, better and more 
cheaply.'"(pp:17-18) This ignores the fact that 
the platemill under consideration will come on 
stream at the end of this period and operate over 
a 15-20 year time horizon when huge technological 
upheavals with attendant locational consequences 
are confidently expected. 
(iii) Scottish Steel in the 1980s 
As the Glasgow Study notes, "the Scottish plants 
received substantial amounts of fixed investment 
in the 1970s which provided capacity and machinery 
to produce high quality steel and steel 
products."(p:8) Thus, at the start of the previous 
decade Ravenscraig presented BS with its lowest 
cost route to manufacturing high quality strip 
products. In technical terms Ravenscraig was BS's 
best plant and offered concast and secondary steel 
making which did not exist at other sites. The 
1980/81 Corporate Strategy published in December 
1979 illustrates the strong position that the 
Scottish plant found itself in. This document set 
out that, in the event of BS standing down strip 
making capacity, the two technically inferior 
Welsh operations would bear the burden of closure. 
Within 2 years this situation was reversed and in 
an environment of substantial excess capacity BS 
began to argue publicly that Ravenscraig was 
surplus to requirements. The thrust of BS's 
argument, set out in evidence to several House of 
Commons Select Committees, was that the Welsh 
stripmills were larger scale, better laid out and 
closer to final customers. In 1982, following 
considerable pressure from Scottish interests, 
Ministerial intervention secured a guarantee for 
Ravenscraig until 1987. However all through the 
1980s, BS officers argued consistently that 
Ravenscraig was likely to be closed but stressed 
that the closure would be "phased" over a 
considerable time period. 
BS's investment programme in the first part of the 
1980s was Subject to 2 mutually reinforcing 
pressures. First, the Davignon Plan restricted the 
basis and level of state aid to the Corporation 
and all other steelmakers as part of Europe-wide 
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measures designed to effect modernisation, 
restructuring and capacity reduction. Second, 
complimentary pressure was exerted by the UK 
government who set tight financial targets in 
order to induce cost reductions and greater 
commercial viability as a prelude to the flotation 
of the company. During and since that period, BS 
investments have essentially been either repairs 
of existing plant or the installation of process 
innovations at the 4 English and Welsh works. This 
latter expenditure served to bring the other 
operations up to the same technical standards as 
their Scottish counterpart. From the early 1980s, 
our analysis sought to stress that Ravenscraig was 
protected within the BS system by technical 
advantages which offset the locational 
disadvantages argued to derive from smaller scale 
and distance from markets. However, the pattern of 
investment served to erode Ravenscraig's 
technological advantages leaving the plant 
increasingly vulnerable to phased contractionary 
strategies which appeared to offer BS a lower cost 
route to supplying the same level of demand. The 
view that BS was engaged in a strategic phased 
retreat from Scotland was further strengthened by 
the publication in 1985 of the strategy document 
BSC: the Future. This paper announced the closure 
of Ravenscraig's dedicated finishing facilities at 
Gartcosh and implied a situation in the 1990s in 
which the Motherwell plant served as a denuded 
provider of slabs for further processing at other 
sites. Matters were further clarified by the 
statement of 3rd December 1987 in which BS set out 
that, subject to market conditions, the 
Ravenscraig steelmaking end and the Dalzell 
platemill would be required but that the future of 
strip rolling would be reviewed in 1989. In 1987-
88, this phased retreat scenario was thoroughly 
tested for Motherwell District Council by 
management consultants Arthur Young. This exercise 
set out how BS could eliminate their Scottish 
operation without loss of volume by 1994. The 
report traced the exact dynamics of withdrawal 
drawing particular attention to the to the 
increases in capacity derived from debottlenecking 
the Welsh plants. The Arthur Young report 
concluded that "we estimate that the increase in 
BSC profits from these closures would be around 
£100 million per annum, compared to 'one-off 
closure costs of redundancy and other cash costs 
of £50m net, and a capital write off of £130m for 
plant and equipment."(p:1) 
The Arthur Young plant configuration forecasts 
have been vindicated by subsequent events. In 
September 1988, BS announced the installation of a 
second concast machine at Port Talbot which should 
be fully operational in 1991. This leaves the 
Ravenscraig strip mill vulnerable to the poor 
short term outlook for strip products because the 
completion of this project provides BS with an 
additional 600000 tpy of concast based product. 
The Arthur Young view saw the potential to 
rationalise platemaking at Scunthorpe by 1993/94. 
To accommodate this, BS would require to commence 
the construction of any integrated platemill in 
1990 or 1991. As set out in previous Commentaries, 
BS have taken a decision to remain in this market 
and have convened an internal working party to 
consider future platemaking capacity. This group 
was established in June 1989 and BS have always 
maintained that no conclusions would be reported 
before the middle of this year. 
In our view, the Glasgow Study fails 
comprehensively to overturn the conclusions of the 
Arthur Young analysis. As is set out below, the 
report fails to substantiate 2 key conclusions set 
out in the executive summary. 
(iv) British Steel's Investment Policy 
"the apparent policy of BS to under invest in 
recent years in its Scottish plants compared to 
its other plants is not easy to explain in strict 
economic grounds." (Executive Summary p:1). 
We view this assertion as an attempt to suggest 
that the series of investment decisions which have 
resulted in the present, precarious situation 
facing the Scottish Steel industry could not be 
justified on the grounds of a proper appraisal. To 
present a sensible case, the term "in recent 
years" requires to be defined elastically. In our 
view, the chain of decisions which currently serve 
to eclipse Scottish steelmaking are of an order of 
9-10 years old. The Scottish Steel lobby was 
presented with its last meaningful opportunity to 
question the strategic assumptions in 1985 and did 
not take it. However, we will return to these 
considerations after a brief survey of the 
arguments which the Glasgow Study advances in 
support of this proposition. 
The Glasgow Study makes 4 basic points relevant to 
the investment issue. First, "the Scottish plants 
have received only a small share of replacement 
and modernisation investment in recent 
years."(p:5) Second, the report cites the 
conclusions of the MMC evaluation of BSC with 
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respect to investment appraisal methodology. In 
this report, the MMC endorses the findings of the 
Warwick University analyses of the closures of 
steelraaking at Shotton and Corby conducted in the 
early 1980s for the ISTC. The Warwick study 
concludes that in these exercises valid 
alternatives to the preferred strategy were either 
not assessed or were burdened with adverse and 
questionable assumptions. In short, BSC appear to 
use appraisal techniques to support a preferred 
strategy rather than to help choose between 
plausible competing strategies. This prompts the 
authors to raise the possibility that "BS's 
investment decisions may not have been based upon 
systematic evaluation of the comparative 
profitability of investment at different sites and 
that the returns from locating investment projects 
in Scotland may not have received systematic 
appraisal." (p:8) Third, the report sets out that 
"the view that the Scottish plants suffer a 
comparative locational disadvantage does not bear 
close scrutiny either in terms of the Scottish 
plants' comparative advantage in importing raw 
materials or the Scottish plants' proximity to 
final users (including Shotton)." (p:8) Four, 
given the emerging trend of greater segmentation 
of product markets, the study argues that the 
smaller converters at Ravenscraig are "likely to 
be a positive advantage since it will allow lower 
cost production of small batches of high quality 
steels". The report continues that "such small 
scale production at [Port Talbot and Llanwern] is 
likely to be uneconomic" but that "it is in the 
low volume high quality end of the market that 
demand is likely to expand most rapidly"(p:22) 
Taken together, these points in themselves are not 
sufficient to justify the above assertion and the 
report has been severely criticised on this basis. 
Whilst we accept that the Glasgow study does not 
convincingly or conclusively substantiate this 
point, we feel that there is a case to answer. As 
set out in Section (iii), the BS attitude towards 
its Scottish operations changed markedly shortly 
after the completion of the 1980/81 Corporate Plan 
in December 1979. In our view the critical 
decisions are those which sanctioned the 
modernisation of the Port Talbot HSM and the 
upgrading of Llanwern both at a time of 
substantial UK and global excess capacity in strip 
making. In the 1980/81 document, the relatives 
strengths and weaknesses of each of BS's 5 
integrated plants is set out. As pointed out above 
options which led to the closure of Ravenscraig 
were clearly rejected because "the main advantages 
of Scotland over Llanwern will come from the 
concast facilities for slab production which is 
worth £20 tonne of hot rolled coil. In addition, 
the benefit of larger vessels at Hunterston partly 
offset the higher rail cost of moving ore to 
Ravenscraig compared with Port 
Talbot/Llanwern."(ISTC:p:110) The smaller 
Ravenscraig steel converters were viewed adversely 
but the secondary steelmaking and vacuum degassing 
facilities and the characteristics of the strip 
mill were viewed as strong points in the plants' 
favour. 
Llanwern was viewed to possess 4 main strengths. 
First, "a new blast furnace rated at 5000 tpd". 
Second, "the best hot mill in the Corporation 
being a fully continuous mill with five large 
reheating furnaces capable of processing 3.5mt of 
liquid steel into 2.9 m tonne of hot rolled 
coil(miId steel) It was designed to produce coil 
weights of lOOOlbs an inch of width which even for 
the narrower tin plate width produces large coils 
of up to 16 tonnes giving better yields in 
finishing mills and at customary works." Third, 
"the mills are closer to some of the Corporation's 
main customers."(ibid:p:109) Four, LLanwern was 
argued to have "a good reputation with users such 
as the motor industry"(ibid:pp:113). The plants 
weaknesses were to be found in the steelmaking and 
casting processes. It was noted that "all imported 
ore and coal has to come via Port Talbot where 
vessel size is restricted to around 100 Kt." and 
that 60% of the coke oven capacity "require 
replacing or substituting with imported coke." In 
addition, the document details the lack of vacuum 
degassing and concast facilities which "because of 
steel plant layout -would be costly to 
install"(ibid:pp:110) At Port Talbot the reverse 
was the case. The plant was a true coastal 
location with modern iron and steelmaking plant, 
secondary steelmaking and a slab caster under 
construction which would enable a throughput of 3 
m tpy of liquid steel. The hot mill was viewed as 
poor with "serious limitations on coil weights and 
output"(ibid:p:110). 
The optimal solution in the 1980/81 strategy was 
to use the Port Talbot steelmaking and casting 
operation in conjunction with the Llanwern mill. 
Any increased demand could be met by utilising 
Ravenscraig more fully by employing the third BF 
which was currently being rebuilt. The Document 
was not sanguine about the Welsh strip operations 
noting that "on the face of it, the plan leaves 
little capacity for increased production of hot 
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rolled coil if the mills are judged against recent 
performance." (ibid:p:116) This plant 
configuration and production potential was 
suggested to be "the best possible situation, 
having regard to the facilities as they exist and 
the limited financial resources likely to be 
available." (ibid:p:117) In our view, the factor 
that changed was the introduction in February 1980 
of the EEC's code on state aid and subsequent 
revision of August 1981 which dictated that 
investment subsidies would only be authorised on 
the basis of clear programmes to restructure and 
reduce capacity. In our view, BS hatched the plan 
to modernise its Welsh operations and receive 
state aid on the basis that it would reduce 
capacity at other sites. Whatever the case, within 
2 years of the publication of the 1980/81 
Corporate Plan, BSC were proceeding upon entirely 
different assumptions and demanding that 
Ravenscraig be closed. This account indicates that 
the watershed decision appears to be the 
modernisation of the Port Talbot strip mill. Once 
this was taken, the small amounts of investment at 
the hot end and casting stage at Llanwern were 
always going to be justified in comparison with 
expansionary Scottish options on the basis of the 
superior potential of the mill and the proximity 
to finishing facilities. This also provides 
justification of programmes to modernise and 
construct strip finishing and processing 
facilities in Wales. 
Given the prevailing forecast levels of demand, 
the 1985 decisions to install the Alpha Steel 
concast equipment at Llanwern and close Gartcosh 
compelled the conclusion that BSC had set in train 
forces which would inevitably result in the demise 
of steelmaking in Scotland. At the time, we viewed 
the issue as Ravenscraig versus Llanwern and were 
amongst those who felt that the campaign ought to 
have been conducted on this basis. With 
hindsight, it is almost certain that a Scottish 
option would have been validly rejected. However, 
we were advised that such a course was 
unacceptable to the Scottish Steel Lobby which 
felt compelled to reject any arguments which 
challenged the existing 5 plant policy of the 
steel unions and the various political groupings. 
In the event the focus of the reaction to BSC: The 
Future became the Gartcosh Mill when the central 
issue related to whether it was more sensible to 
debottleneck Ravenscraig or upgrade Llanwern. 
Thus, strategies based on featuring the locational 
merits of the Scottish operation were both likely 
to fail in the 1980s but would have proved 
unacceptable to the Scottish Lobby including the 
sponsors of the present Glasgow Study. 
The 1985 decision provided the last opportunity 
for Scots to mount a coherent case based upon the 
BF-BOS technology. Following this, unless it can 
be demonstrated that BS require a steelmake 
greater than the potential afforded by its other 4 
integrated plants, the Scottish operation is 
vulnerable to the argument that a similar 
throughput can be produced at lower unit cost by 
transferring production from Scotland. If the 
Glasgow criticism of unsystematic strategic 
evaluation has any force, the approach requires to 
be applied to the curious decision to modernise 
the Port Talbot HSM in the early 1980s. In our 
view, this changed the strategic position of 
Ravenscraig irretrievably by setting it against 
the superior capacity at the more optimal Llanwern 
location. After the Port Talbot decision, we 
would strongly refute any suggestion that BSC's 
investments could not be vindicated on the basis 
of a fair appraisal because the best available 
forecasts of demand suggested that Ravenscraigs 
steelmake could be readily dispensed with. 
In our view, the absence of significant Scottish 
investment from the early 1980s onwards is neither 
surprising nor unwarranted. From BS's standpoint, 
no capacity enhancing investment would prove cost 
effective. In addition, Ravenscraig started the 
1980s as BSC's most technologically advanced 
plant. The other plants required to catch up and 
this process is all but complete. The salient 
strategic issue relates to where this investment 
dynamic leaves the Motherwell operation in the mid 
1990s. After that point, coke ovens will require 
to be rebuilt and blast furnaces relined. These 
are a set of costs about which the Glasgow Study 
falls silent. If BS are to persevere with 
Ravenscraig into the 21st century it would require 
a rolling programme of investment at the 
Motherwell plant. It is at this juncture that the 
old steelmaking technology becomes vulnerable to 
the new. No strategic appraisal of Scotland's 
steel industry can validly ignore this fact. 
(v) The Platemill Decision. 
"It would be in the interests of the shareholders 
of BS if one of the Scottish options was chosen ie 
upgrade Dalzell or put a new mill at Ravenscraig." 
(Executive Summary:p:2) 
We do not accept that this case has been 
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substantiated by the Glasgow Study. However, it is 
our view that the following conclusions should be 
accepted without reservation. First, that Dalzell 
compares favourably with all its European 
counterparts in terms of product range and 
quality. Second, that with investment of between 
£80m and £11Om, Dalzell could be transformed into 
an even better mill offering an enhanced range of 
products more efficiently. Indeed, we view the 
Report's demolition of the BS view that Dalzell is 
an ageing platemill to be both cogent and well 
directed. However, the aforementioned paper by Mr 
Ted Ramsay argues that BS wi11 not favour an 
inland location because of the constraints placed 
upon the product range by the overland transport 
system. This could emerge as an argument in favour 
of Lackenby which is the only truly coastal site 
under consideration. The Glasgow Study makes no 
comment and implicitly assumes that the product 
range required will be similar to that presently 
marketed. Third, we accept that the it would be 
more expensive to construct an integrated 
platemill at Lackenby or Scunthorpe compared with 
Ravenscraig because of a requirement for greater 
expenditure on concast machines and reheating 
furnaces. 
Whilst we accept these key conclusions and much 
beside, we do not consider that they constitute an 
illustration that the Scottish options provide the 
best solution for BS shareholders. The problem 
with Glasgow the analysis is that despite some 
favourable evidence, the platemill decision has 
not been placed in its proper context. A critical 
deficiency is that the report fails to 
demonstrate conclusively that BS will need 
Ravenscraigs' steel output. A version of the 
Arthur Young analysis appears to be favoured by BS 
who have presented a similar account at various 
points in the recent past. Thus, the conclusion 
which must be overturned relates to whether it is 
still the case that BS can produce its desired 
steelmake with lower unit costs using 4 integrated 
sites as opposed to 5. Despite limited sympathy 
with the view that Ravenscraig's smaller steel 
converters ought to be more favourably regarded 
than in previous BS assessments, we would argue 
that the key issue is that of demand. A refutation 
of the Arthur Young conclusions requires a clear 
demonstration that BS require a steelmake beyond 
the potential of its 4 English and Welsh 
operations. 
The Glasgow Study provides a review of the general 
outlook for world, European and domestic demand. 
In addition, Chapter 3 sets out a useful summary 
of the approaches to demand forecasting emoloyed 
by the ECSC in formulating their General 
Objectives for Steel 1995. However the material 
presented supports only the general conclusion 
that 'demand prospects for steel are favourable'. 
In our view, the Report fails to provide a 
sufficiently detailed discussion of the evolution 
of either UK steel demand or the demand for BS's 
product range. Instead, a set of propositions are 
elaborated and the following line of argument 
established. Demand prospects are favourable. The 
UK market has been subject to increasing import 
penetration and BS increasingly commands a smaller 
proportion of its home market. In recent years, 
the average value per tonne of UK imports has been 
greater than the average value per tonne of UK 
exports. These facts are not in dispute. However, 
the Glasgow Study merely rests content in 
presenting this information but does not indicate 
what conclusions should be drawn. It is our 
contention that the researchers set out this data 
to imply that there are profitable markets both at 
home and abroad which BS could serve and thus 
increase the probability that it will require its 
Scottish operation. If this is the motive, then it 
is our view than further analysis is both needed 
and warranted to substantiate the point. 
At present, the oxygen converters at the 5 BS 
integrated plants can produce a steel output of 
circa 17.7m tpy. If one allows for upstream and 
downstream constraints, the effective steelmaking 
capacity of the 5 works is circa 16.8 tpy. This 
consists of 4.4m tpy at Scunthorpe, 3.6m tpy at 
Teeside, 3.2m tpy at Port Talbot following the 
commissioning of the second caster later this 
year, 3.4m tpy at Llanwern and 2.2m tpy at 
Ravenscraig. Thus, without Ravenscraig, BS can 
produce a maximum of circa 14.6m tpy. BS's liquid 
steelmake out-turned at 14.70 mt in 1988 and 14.21 
mt in 1989. Indeed, in the financial year 1988/89 
BS produced 15.4 mt of liquid steel. These volumes 
include BS's relatively small electric arc 
capacity and must therefore be adjusted. Taking 
this into account, we estimate that BS's oxygen 
converters processed approximately 14.1 mt in 
1988, 13.6 mt in 1989 and 14.7-14.8 mt in 1988/89. 
Thus, at the end of the previous decade, British 
Steel operated at levels close to the maximum 
which would be permitted without Scottish 
production. 
Although a survey of Scottish steel users has been 
undertaken, the results were not presented in the 
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final report. Thus, the Report concentrates its 
efforts at the European level and presents some 
discussion of the ECSC assessment of future global 
and sectoral demand. On average, the European 
economy is forecast to grow by 3.0% p.a. and steel 
demand by 1.3% p.a. Production is estimated to 
rise from a total of 137m tpy in 1988 to between 
138-143m tpy in 1995. The output of ECSC products 
is forecast to rise from 111.7m tpy in 1988 to 
114.7m tpy in 1995 following a fall to 110.7m tpy 
in 1992. Thus most of the modest forecast net 
growth in EC steel demand is absorbed by increased 
third country imports. This can be justified with 
reference to the elimination of import quotas 
which the Community intends to enforce during this 
period. As implied above, both demand and output 
growth are projected to decline or stagnate in the 
1990-92 period and recover thereafter. Indeed, 
some forecasting bodies estimate that this 
recovery will be strong. Thus, US market analysts 
Paine Webber have argued that, in terms of the 
world steel market, "there would be a sharp 
rebound of pricing and a return to steel shortage 
conditions in 1991-92." 
The product range is a key corporate decision. 
BS's broad criteria for remaining in a market 
segment relates to the ability to operate existing 
or proposed plant at high levels of capacity 
utilisation supplying product which can be 
marketed at a specified margin. Post 
privatisation, BS have embarked upon a review of 
their product range and this has already resulted 
in both contractionary and expansionary programmes 
in certain areas. The importance of this to the 
Scottish issue is the demonstration that changes 
in the supply policy of products not currently 
produced in Scotland will affect the overall steel 
requirement and thus the likelihood that 
Ravenscraig's capacity will be required. 
Even allowing for a favourable general market 
outlook, the evolution and future profile of the 
product range is subject to considerable 
uncertainty. At present, BS produces circa 2.5 tpy 
of semi-finished product. The vast majority of 
this is sold to producers which used to be part of 
BS and in which BS has some form of equity stake. 
In addition, circa 0.4m tpy of slabs are 
dispatched to a US associate. At present BS does 
not sell substantial volumes of semis on the open 
market although if prices were strong BS could use 
its excess steelmaking capacity in this segment. 
Second, there have been decisions to remain in the 
markets for plate and welded tube which have 
resulted in BS seeking to buy surplus foreign 
capacity for installation in the UK. The decision 
concerning seamless tube is imminent. In terms of 
strip products the picture is mixed. BS faces 
ongoing difficulty with respect to tin-plate due 
to corporate rationalisation of the packaging 
sector. This serves to reduce the required 
production of strip and has implications for 
Ravenscraig. Although Continental markets will be 
generally stronger, BS is forecast to experience 
reduced demand from the UK Motor industry in the 
next 2 years. In principle, the UK car industry 
could export this problem away but recent data 
suggests that some abatement in strip demand from 
this source is likely in the short term. However, 
the medium term outlook for the UK automotive 
sector is favourable. By the mid 1990s, 3 new 
Japanese car plants supplying an additional 500000 
cars will be onstream. Toyota have recently 
indicated that they are seeking a further European 
site and that the UK is a strong contender. Ford 
intend to step up the production of luxury cars 
through expansion of activity at Jaguar although 
offsetting contraction of volume production is 
likely. 
As set out in last quarter's Commentary, the UK 
domestic market is likely to decline more sharply 
than its Continental counterparts. However, most 
UK macro forecasts suggest that British exporters 
will be faced with a favourable exchange rate 
trend. Given that BS is widely regarded as one of 
the world's more efficient producers, one could 
suggest that BS and its customers ought to be 
able to increase penetration of continental 
markets. However, BS has recently announced price 
rises across much of the flat product range at a 
time of ongoing production pauses in Community 
markets. Whilst this will protect margins, it will 
facilitate greater import penetration and check 
the rate of export growth. Further price rises are 
expected in the second quarter. This behaviour 
illustrates that the level of production can be 
manipulated by BS and that it is profit and not 
output which will be maximised in the coming 
decade. As these pricing decisions largely relate 
to strip products we cannot be confident about the 
future of the Ravenscraig strip mill once 
additional concast product becomes available at 
Port Talbot. 
Contrary to the impression given in the Glasgow 
report, BS's share of the market for its product 
range actually increased between 1987/88 and 
1988/89 and stands at 62.2%. This is extremely 
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high by European standards. The recent 
acquisitions of UK stockists should help 
consolidate this position although the proposed 
purchase of the Walker Group is subject to an EEC 
inquiry. Should BS succeed in acquiring the lions 
share of the UK stockholding market, it has the 
potential to engender further penetration of the 
domestic markets within its product range. 
However, the potential of this source of growth is 
likely to be modest in comparison with the 
potential afforded by greater penetration of EC 
markets. Again our analysis is subject to 
considerable uncertainty. As set out in previous 
Commentaries, BS has been acquiring Continental 
distributors and steel processors. At present BS 
are known to be in discussion with both Klockner 
and Hoesch concerning purchase of mills and joint 
ventures in strip coating facilities. As long as 
BS does not acquire steelmaking capacity, then 
these events may work to the possible benefit of 
Scotland. The purchase of German rolling mills, 
investment in a part share of the throughput of a 
new German strip coating facility and greater 
access to the German distribution network could 
engender dramatic increases in the capability to 
export semis and part processed material as well 
as final product. In our view, the UK will remain 
a low cost base from which to market such output. 
Thus, demand in BS's domestic market is set to 
grow slowly during the 1990-95 period following a 
sharp slowdown in the first part of this time 
horizon. European demand is projected to grow 
modestly but output stagnates owing to increased 
import penetration of EC markets by third 
countries following elimination of tariff 
barriers. BS are pursuing strategies designed to 
increase its capability to compete in Continental 
markets and has a favourable cost and exchange 
rate environment in which to base this exercise. 
The EC seem determined to fashion a liberalised 
Community market in which BS is in a strong 
position to outperform most of its Continental 
rivals. However, recent pricing and product policy 
serves to indicate that BS executives intend to 
reduce production in areas where margins are poor. 
This implies that BS may favour a strategy which 
reduces production to levels at which a higher 
expected rate of return can be generated by 
working remaining capacity at consistently high 
utilisation rates. In short, BS will choose to 
slim down to a smaller better integrated and more 
efficient configuration which can operate with 
high load factors in high margin segments in most 
likely states of the world. Thus, the optimal size 
of BS is an issue that requires further detailed 
study. 
In our view, the situation has improved 
dramatically since the Arthur Young Report was 
conducted. In the AY scenario expected demand in 
the middle of the 1990s was such that Ravenscraigs 
steel output was neither required nor likely to be 
required in the latter part of the decade. BS 
could easily fit Scottish production at other 
sites with little scope for contrary analysis. 
Previous Commentaries have documented that, since 
1987, demand has consistently evolved more 
strongly than all international forecasters 
predicted. In particular, BS Chairman Sir Robert 
Scholey has commented on several occasions that BS 
viewed production to be rising above the long run 
trend. Given BS's success in this period and 
despite the adverse short term situation it is 
possible to argue that BS strategies could result 
in a steelmake of at least 14.2-14.3M tpy in 1995 
with the prospect that demand will grow strongly 
in the subsequent 5 years. That case has yet to be 
fully established. However, our discussion of 
recent BS activity should stress that the optimal 
size and loading of BS capacity is a choice 
variable and that these choices are being 
exercised at the moment. 
These considerations are highly relevant to the 
options put forward by the Glasgow Study. In our 
best possible scenario, the option to integrate 
the platemill at Motherwell by constructing a new 
mill on the Ravenscraig site is a clear non 
starter. Our best assessment of demand in 1995 is 
that it will attain the levels reached at the end 
of the decade. Given the ongoing evolution of 
supply, this suggests that BS will not at that 
point require Ravenscraig's steel production. To 
justify this option, one requires to demonstrate 
that BS will see the need to continue production 
at its fifth site and that this case will be so 
clear that BS wi11 be prepared to modernise the 
iron and steelmaking capacity. Even if the case 
can be made that BS can operate in the long run 
with sufficient good margin business to support a 
steelmake in excess of 16M tpy the impact of new 
technology in the Scottish context must be 
assessed. If BS is going to have access to a new 
steelmaking process from the mid 1990s, it will 
not wish to refurbish BF-BOS operations. Thus if a 
case for a steelmake greater than the potential of 
the 4 English and Welsh operations can be made, 
the best integrated option would involve the new 
technology. In our view, the Glasgow Study fails 
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to justify its conclusion that an integrated 
platemill is in the best interests of BS 
shareholders because it does not demonstrate that 
BS will need all or part of the supply potential 
at Motherwell. In reality, Scottish options based 
on new technology would dominate this option if an 
accommodating level of demand can be established. 
There remains the possibility that an upgrade of 
the present Dalzell mill may prove more an 
attractive strategy. This is correctly identified 
by the Glasgow study as a low cost means of 
supplying future plate demands. Abstracting from 
the issue of whether BS could produce and market 
the future, desired product range at a refurbished 
Dalzell, this presents a strong option. In 
principle, Dalzell could exist as an island site 
fed by Lackenby or other works if Ravenscraig were 
to be closed. A similar strong option not 
considered by the Glasgow Study is the 
refurbishment of the Appelby Mill at Scunthorpe. 
Whilst this presents higher costs in terms of 
casting facilities and reheating furnaces, these 
may be lower than those suggested by the Glasgow 
research if Scottish facilities can be 
cannibalised. This option presents the prospect of 
energy savings and net lower transport costs in 
production and distribution. Such streams of 
benefits would serve to offset the project cost 
advantages which could be identified for a stand 
alone Scottish plate mill. A demonstration that a 
detached, refurbished Scottish platemill is a 
superior option to a refurbished Scunthorpe 
platemill has not been set out by the Glasgow 
Study. Indeed the refurbished option considered in 
the Glasgow Study assumes invalidly that a supply 
of slabs from nearby Ravenscraig will be 
costlessly available over the time horizon of the 
project. As set out above this has not been 
established and failure to do this implies a set 
of costs accruing to an island site not considered 
by the Glasgow researchers. 
Thus, unless strong evidence can be provided which 
indicates that BS see a continuing need for a 
steelmake in substantial excess of 14.6M tpy, we 
would suggest that the view that Scottish 
platemill options are in the best interests of BS 
shareholders must be rejected. In this situation, 
the integrated Motherwell option is a clear non-
starter and the island Dalzell option likely to be 
dominated by a Scunthorpe upgrade. If such 
evidence exists, the impact of Direct Smelting 
would require to be assessed. In these respects, 
it is our view that the Glasgow Study has failed 
to set the Dalzell decision in proper context and 
has failed to provide evidence to support the case 
for continuing plate production in Scotland. It is 
not possible to isolate the platemill decision 
from a wider set of demand and technical issues. 
The explicit and invalid attempt to do this 
results in an incorrect and limited analysis of 
the prospects for the Scottish Steel industry 
which serves no-one well. 
(vi) Concluding Remarks. 
In the December 1989 Commentary it was suggested 
that the previously solid Scottish Steel lobby has 
irretrievably fragmented. Thus the Ravenscraig 
shop stewards did not support or co-operate with 
the body which commissioned the Glasgow research. 
It has been suggested to us that, because of this 
split, those commissioning the study did not wish 
their consultants to discuss steelmaking or strip 
making but instead to concentrate narrowly on the 
plate mill in isolation from the influences 
shaping the remainder of the Scottish sector. Our 
message to all concerned is that BS will not take 
the platemill decision on criteria which reflect 
the politics and demarcations inherent within the 
Scottish lobby. An explicit and direct attempt to 
overturn the Arthur Young dynamic was called for. 
This involves a holistic approach to BS and the 
Scottish situation culminating in a clear and 
detailed demonstration that BS need a Scottish 
steelmaking operation. This has not emerged and is 
one major source of criticism of this study. We 
accept the broad message concerning lower Scottish 
project costs but cannot support the conclusion 
that this demonstrates that BS best interests are 
served by proceeding on this basis. This is 
because the steel supply for a new or modernised 
Scottish plate mill implies a set of costs which 
have not been quantified. Thus, the conclusions 
set out in the Glasgow Report with respect to 
platemaking are correct only in a limited and 
artificial context. 
As with the Gartcosh episode, it is not 
appropriate to view the plate mill as the 
significant issue. Ultimately, this will be 
located near to a source of long run steel supply 
and this is what requires to be justified in 
Scotland. If one can conclude that it is in BS's 
best interests to produce steel in Scotland then a 
case for platemill and other developments is soon 
substantiated. The Glasgow analysis fails to 
determine this. 
70 
In our view, the enduring value of this paper is 
the emphasis on fundamentals. Scotland has 
advantages in steelmaking which largely derive 
from the existence of the ore terminal at 
Hunterston. This was engendered by BS via the 1973 
10-Year Development Plan and recognised as 
recently as the 1980/81 Corporate Strategy. Our 
research over the last 8 years has never sought to 
deny this. However, it was and remains our view 
that these advantages are offset by the savings 
afforded to BS by retreating from Scotland and 
that this has been the case since the decision to 
upgrade Port Talbot taken in the early 1980s. In 
our view demand has evolved favourably to the 
extent that in the late 1990s BS could be 
operating at production levels which justify 
investment in Scottish steelmaking capacity. It is 
our long-standing view that, if this can be 
demonstrated satisfactorily, the best case for the 
Scottish Steel industry relates to, and possible 
the adoption of, direct smelting technology which 
can be argued on the basis of an additional set of 
dynamic efficiency grounds. Thus, a second major 
criticism of the Glasgow Study pertains to the 
short sighted and invalid treatment of the 
technological issue. 
The fragmentation of the Scottish Steel lobby has 
resulted in the emergence of a clear grouping 
dedicated to advancing a new technology case. This 
consists of a number of former BS officers led by 
Sir Monty Finnieston. In addition, these figures 
tend to be members of the Liberal Democrats. 
Finnieston was the architect of the 1973 Corporate 
Plan which secured the construction of facilities 
at Hunterston. The endpoint of this plan was the 
ultimate closure of the BF-BOS plant at Motherwell 
and its replacement by direct reduction-electric 
arc methods of steel production based at 
Hunterston. As Love and Stevens(1989) sets out, 
this grand plan was abandoned in 1978 and the 
consequences of its partial completion by that 
date have afflicted the prospects of the Scottish 
operation ever since. In the original version BS 
located Scottish production at Hunterston, 
following the Port Talbot/Llanwern modernisations 
the most likely outcome for Scotland has been a no 
technology rather than a new technology endpoint. 
In the mid 1980s, we served as advisers to a 
Commission chaired by Sir Monty Finnieston which 
sought to establish whether a new technology 
argument could be sensibly put. The impetus for 
this derived from statements made by BSC Chairman 
Sir Ian MacGregor on the future role of Hunterston 
during a visit to the Glengarnock Works in 1983. 
MacGregor claimed that BS would perfect a world 
beating process based upon the DR technology 
presently unused at Hunterston and would supply 
world markets from that location. At that time, we 
viewed that a process of coal gasification to 
activate an economic DR-EA route lay behind this 
statement. By the mid 1980s we had discovered that 
BS were involved in developing the direct smelting 
technology discussed above. However, we viewed 
that the depressed and protection distorted world 
markets were not favourable to the concept of a 
remote export-oriented Scottish coastal plant and 
that Hunterston was ruled out by market 
considerations. Love and Stevens(1989), written in 
Autumn 1988, reflected fully both this view and 
the Arthur Young scenario, and concluded that 
Scottish Steel production was doomed to end in 
1993 or 1994 in an environment hostile to the 
Hunterston concept. 
Events have persuaded us to re-examine our 
position. First, the Arthur Young scenario has 
turned out to be too pessimistic. Although further 
research is needed BS prospects appear such that 
an argument based on demand and new technology is 
worthy of serious consideration. Whilst, it is our 
view that the Glasgow Study establishes clearly 
that the optimal Scottish location for BS would be 
Hunterston, a wider set of social considerations 
would substantiate a case for Motherwell. The 
refurbishment of Dalzell could be better grounded 
on a supply of feedstock from a direct smelter in 
Scotland. Second, an end to the protectionist 
status of both the US and EC markets appears 
likely by the middle of the decade. Third, the 
work of both Mr. Ramsay and the Glasgow 
researchers persuades us that Scotland has a case 
to present within a British Steel context. Because 
all of the raw materials for steelmaking require 
to be imported from other continents, there may be 
a cost advantage to be derived from transporting 
semi-finished and processed goods from a 
peripheral location to finishing facilities and 
final customers nearer or at the centre as opposed 
to transporting ore etc to central steelmaking 
sites. Given BS's European strategy of buying or 
developing continental finishing activity this 
argument will continue to gain force. 
Steelmaking is a high technology activity which 
Scotland should relinquish with great reluctance. 
Those who make reference to steelmaking in terms 
of a declining, low-tech and expendable Scottish 
activity misread the global situation. There will 
71 
be a continuing need for steel and this will be 
produced to increasingly exact properties for an 
increasing set of uses. This will be undertaken in 
furnaces and mills of ever increasing technical 
sophistication. In principle, as the Glasgow Study 
concludes, Scotland has the potential to be a 
sound base for steel production. Their mistake is 
to attempt to support old technology and 
relatively inferior locations. This serves to 
distort the key message in the study that Scotland 
is a good steelmaking centre. This has been 
engineered by the 1973 Development Plan and the 
issue for Scotland is if and when this thinking 
will be pressed with full effect to BS by Scottish 
interests. If a Scottish steel industry is to 
survive through the 1990s the Scottish lobby must 
identify the strongest case. For BS, development 
of new technology is a major global player in the 
21st century. Both new technology and no 
technology end points present the same implication 
for North Lanarkshire. At least in the former 
case, Scotland stays in the game. 
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